---
title: "DisInfo2026 : Europe cannot defend itself with its eyes shut"
date: 2026-10-07T16:26:35.952Z
author: Ricardo Mendes
url: https://rmendes.net/articles/2026/10/07/disinfo2026-europe-cannot-defend-itself/
type: articles
categories:
  - "DisInfo2026"
  - "FIMI"
  - "Europe"
  - "USA"
description: "Washington has spied on its allies, weaponised their dependence and punished their independence. Europe needs a spine. Waiting for America to “return to normal” is surrender dressed as diplomacy."
ai_text_level: "0"
tokens: 3269
content_signal: ai-train=yes, search=yes, ai-input=yes
---

# DisInfo2026 : Europe cannot defend itself with its eyes shut

Apparently, asking whether the United States interferes in Europe is still too uncomfortable for some of the institutions supposed to defend us against foreign interference.

[Rapporteur reports](https://www.rapporteur.com/news/eeas-runs-scared-of-us-disinformation-debate/) that the EEAS, Lithuania’s foreign ministry and Global Affairs Canada disappeared from the supporters’ list of an EU DisinfoLab conference amid controversy over a panel examining American interference. A Lithuanian official explicitly linked his withdrawal as a speaker to disagreement over the assessment of the United States. The reasons for the EEAS and Canadian withdrawals remain unconfirmed.

The possibility that such a discussion could cost a conference institutional support is already appalling. Treating American interference as an unthinkable possibility is ludicrous. The record stretches from attempts to shape European elections to surveillance of European institutions, military pressure and sanctions against international judges.

In [a 1948 report published by the US State Department](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v03/d543), the American ambassador in Rome described his embassy’s organised efforts to strengthen selected parties ahead of Italy’s election. These included distributing political material and publicising warnings that American assistance could disappear if the Communists won. Washington was actively trying to influence another country’s democratic choice.

Decades later, [Snowden’s disclosures exposed US surveillance targeting EU diplomatic missions and French, Italian and Greek embassies](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-leaks-us-bugging-european-allies). The European Parliament subsequently [called for guarantees against US espionage targeting EU institutions and facilities](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A52014IP0230).

Then there is Belgacom. Documents exposed in 2013 attributed *Operation Socialist* to Britain’s GCHQ. An [expert report commissioned by Belgium’s intelligence oversight body](https://www.comiteri.be/images/pdf/rapport_dexpertise_drs_vermeulen_fr.pdf), drawing on the Snowden disclosures, described the apparent use of NSA-controlled servers to infect employees’ computers. The [European Parliament raised the possible consequences for EU institutions using Belgacom’s services](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-010269_EN.html).

The available public evidence places Belgacom within the wider [GCHQ–NSA intelligence-sharing partnership](https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/News-Highlights/Article/Article/2494453/gchq-and-nsa-celebrate-75-years-of-partnership/). It does not disclose the operation’s entire chain of command or every communication intercepted. We are examining the portion of a classified system exposed through leaks, investigations and official records. That visibility is incomplete. It is no reason to minimise the breaches of trust already documented.

European countries. European allies. The European Union itself.

All of this predates Trump.

Nor were Americans immune from abusive surveillance before him: in 2014, the US Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board [concluded that the bulk telephone-records programme lacked a viable legal foundation](https://documents.pclob.gov/e-magazine/AssessmentReport/files/basic-html/page3.html). The existence of legal safeguards and the willingness of intelligence agencies to respect them are separate questions. And American authorisation has never amounted to European consent.

Trump’s two presidencies added further examples of dependence being turned into political pressure.

In his first term, his administration withheld congressionally appropriated security assistance to Ukraine. The [US Government Accountability Office concluded in January 2020 that the withholding violated the law](https://www.gao.gov/products/b-331564).

In March 2025, Washington [paused military assistance and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine](https://www.reuters.com/world/us-cuts-off-intelligence-sharing-with-ukraine-ft-reports-2025-03-05/) while pressing Kyiv towards negotiations. The [joint statement of 11 March](https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-zaiava-za-pidsumkamy-zustrichi-delehatsii-ukrainy-ta-ssha-u-dzhyddi) announced their resumption alongside Ukraine’s acceptance of a proposed ceasefire, subject to Russian agreement. That sequence showed how quickly support for a country resisting invasion could become an instrument of pressure on that same country.

The diplomatic shift was equally stark: on 24 February 2025, the United States [voted alongside Russia against the UN General Assembly resolution on a just and lasting peace in Ukraine](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4076672). These decisions do not make Washington responsible for every subsequent Russian attack. They do make blind confidence in American commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty impossible to justify.

The same coercive logic runs through Trump’s approach to NATO. In February 2024, he [said he would encourage Russia to do “whatever the hell they want”](https://www.investing.com/news/politics/what-did-trump-say-about-nato-funding-and-what-is-article-5-3300841) to allies he considered insufficiently committed to defence spending. In June 2025, NATO agreed a [target of 5% of GDP by 2035](https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/the-hague-summit-declaration): at least 3.5% for core defence, with up to 1.5% for broader defence and security expenditure.

I am not opposed to Europe taking greater responsibility for its defence. We need the capacity to act without waiting for Washington. But threatening to abandon allies to Russian aggression turns a security guarantee into a means of extracting compliance.

JD Vance made the political dimension explicit at Munich on 14 February 2025. In [his speech](https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-remarks-jd-vance-munich-germany-munich-security-conference-february-14-2025/), he presented Europe’s internal politics as the threat he feared most, attacked its handling of speech and migration, and rejected political firewalls. The same day, he [met AfD leader Alice Weidel](https://www.reuters.com/world/vance-meets-with-leader-german-far-right-afd-party-2025-02-14/) ahead of Germany’s election. I regard that as an overt intervention in Europe’s political choices: an American vice-president using his office to pressure Europeans over whom they should admit to power. Being public does not make that pressure politically neutral.

On Palestine, the obstruction is there in the voting record. On 4 June 2025, the United States [vetoed a Security Council resolution demanding a permanent ceasefire in Gaza and the lifting of restrictions on humanitarian aid](https://www.un.org/unispal/document/un-security-council-fails-to-adopt-resolution-calling-for-permanent-ceasefire-in-gaza-owing-to-veto-by-united-states/). Every other member voted in favour.

And when international justice reaches American or Israeli conduct, Washington has moved to punish those administering it. Trump’s first administration [sanctioned ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and senior official Phakiso Mochochoko in 2020](https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2020/09/canada-concerned-by-us-sanctions-imposed-on-international-criminal-court-officials.html). Those measures were [revoked in 2021](https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-welcomes-decision-us-government-ending-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-against-icc). In his second term, Trump [issued a new sanctions order](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/), explicitly attacking the ICC’s actions concerning the United States and Israel. It provides for asset freezes and restrictions on supplying funds, goods and services to designated people.

The consequences reach into ordinary life in Europe.

In [sworn testimony to France’s National Assembly on 8 April 2026](https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/CRCANR5L17S2026PO878304N021.html), French ICC judge Nicolas Guillou described the cancellation of his Visa card, loss of digital services and blocked health-expense reimbursements. His French bank had retained him as a customer but had not provided a replacement payment card. He attributed the insurance problem to European companies’ excessive compliance with American sanctions.

A French judge, living in Europe, facing restrictions on everyday life because of a decision taken in Washington.

The Microsoft case requires precision. [Associated Press reported](https://apnews.com/article/a4b4c02751ab84c09718b1b95cbd5db3), citing ICC staff, that prosecutor Karim Khan lost access to his Microsoft email. [Microsoft denied suspending services to the ICC as an institution](https://www.heise.de/en/news/Microsoft-denies-mail-blockade-at-the-International-Criminal-Court-10429628.html). Questioned about Outlook and Office 365, Guillou said Microsoft’s position on services to sanctioned individuals had changed over time. He also confirmed that the court was migrating towards non-American alternatives.

This remains a live problem. On 1 October 2026, [Reuters reported that the ICC and AXA had ended their insurance contract](https://live.euronext.com/en/financial-news/icc-insurer-axa-cut-ties-amid-trump-campaign-against-court). The court confirmed the change without specifying a reason; the Financial Times, cited by Reuters, reported that AXA had invoked risks from US sanctions.

AI services carry the same dependency. [Anthropic’s commercial terms](https://www.anthropic.com/legal/commercial-terms) restrict access involving US-sanctioned persons and allow service suspension where provision is prohibited by law. That establishes a mechanism for exclusion; it does not establish that a particular ICC judge’s AI account has already been closed. Building public institutions around these services means accepting that external legal and political decisions can affect their availability.

Espionage, electoral intervention, military pressure, sanctions and [foreign information manipulation](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en) are distinct activities. Together, these documented episodes demolish the assumption that alliance with Washington protects Europe from American coercion. Allegations of FIMI deserve scrutiny according to the evidence, including when the actor is American.

Past US support for European integration cannot erase that record. Washington’s own [internal policy documents](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v04/d149) connected that support to American strategic objectives. A stronger Europe serving those objectives and an autonomous Europe willing to oppose them are very different propositions.

Europe needs a backbone. A spine to resist interference from any power, including the United States. No ally should receive an exemption from scrutiny, and no history of cooperation should oblige us to accept coercion.

We need to abandon the comforting assumption inherited from the post-war Atlantic order that whatever serves Washington must, by default, serve Europe too. It does not. American interests are American interests. Any alignment with ours has to be established on the merits, issue by issue.

The internet, markets, climate, democracy, agriculture: in none of these areas should American priorities be our starting point. We should decide what protects our citizens, our rights, our food systems, our public services and our environment. Where cooperation serves those aims, cooperate. Where American demands undermine them, we need the capacity and the political will to refuse.

Trump has made the cost of dependence impossible to ignore. Yet too much of Europe’s institutional response still looks like an attempt to endure an unpleasant interruption, keep Washington comfortable and wait for a more familiar president. Waiting for America to “return to normal” is no strategy for European independence.

The old normal of unquestioned trust is gone. Kaput. Another administration may change American policy; it cannot erase the demonstration of how easily our dependencies can be used against us. Returning to the same vulnerability after seeing that would be a conscious political choice.

Europe needs the practical ability to defend Ukraine, pursue justice for Palestinians, protect its institutions and keep its judges, researchers and public services functioning. That requires control over more than military budgets. It requires resilient communications, payments, software and access to computing—and officials willing to defend European decisions when Washington objects.

**European sovereignty means being able to say no to the United States—or any other power—and still function the next morning.**